They Played the Merger Game: A Retrospective Analysis in the UK Videogames Market by Aguzzoni, Luca et al.
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They Played the Merger Game: A Retrospective 
Analysis in the UK Videogames Market 
 
Luca Aguzzoni 
Elena Argentesi 
Paolo Buccirossi 
Lorenzo Ciari 
Tomaso Duso 
Massimo Tognoni 
Cristina Vitale 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°908 
 
 
 
They Played the Merger Game: 
A Retrospective Analysis in the UK Videogames Market 
 
Luca Aguzzoni 
Lear 
 
Elena Argentesi∗ 
University of Bologna 
 
Paolo Buccirossi 
Lear 
 
Lorenzo Ciari 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
 
Tomaso Duso 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) and 
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) 
 
Massimo Tognoni 
UK Competition Commission 
 
Cristiana Vitale 
OECD 
 
 
September 28, 2013 
  
                                                 
∗ Corresponding author: Elena Argentesi, Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 
40126 Bologna, Italy, Tel: + 39 051 2098661, Fax: +39 051 2098040, E-Mail: elena.argentesi@unibo.it. This 
paper is partially based on a research project we undertook for the UK Competition Commission (CC). We thank 
the CC’s staff for their support during the course of this study. We also thank Adam Lederer for his comments, 
as well as Carlotta Dandolo, Giulio Altomari, Roberto Alimonti and Roberto Cervone for their excellent research 
assistance. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the CC or any of its 
Commissioners. 
2 
 
Abstract:  
We study the effect of a merger in a dynamic high-technology industry–the videogame 
market– which is characterized by frequent introduction of new products. To assess the 
impact of the merger between two large specialist retailers in the UK, we perform a 
difference-in-differences analysis comparing the price evolution of the merging parties to that 
of their 7 major competitors on an original sample of 196 videogames belonging to six 
different consoles. The results of our econometric analyses suggest that there has been a 
reduction in the general level of prices of both new and pre-owned games after the merger. 
This decline has been more marked for the merging parties, which suggests that the merger 
between Game and Gamestation did not lead to a substantial lessening of competition; rather 
it is consistent with the existence of efficiency gains. 
 
Keywords: Mergers, Ex-post Evaluation, Videogames market, Retail sector 
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1. Introduction 
The increasingly widespread resort to retrospective merger studies is often motivated by the 
need for antitrust agencies to assess the realized effects of mergers whose approval was 
controversial.1 The outcome of such studies is important not only to understand whether the 
right decision was taken, but also to assess the quality and the completeness of the analysis 
supporting it in order to inform decision-making in future merger cases.  
In this paper we contribute to the growing literature on ex-post merger evaluation by 
analyzing the effects of the merger between two large UK videogame retailers, Game and 
Gamestation (both chains sold new and pre-owned games), which was approved by the 
Competition Commission (from here on CC) in January 2008.2 This outcome was reached 
after the Group Chairman exerted her casting vote in a situation where the other 4 members 
were evenly divided on several aspects of the merger assessment. In particular, two members 
doubted that the merger would not have anticompetitive effects in the pre-owned segment of 
the market. This disagreement was mainly based on a different view on the definition of the 
relevant (both in terms of product and geography) markets.  
Indeed, the dynamic nature of high-technology industries, such as the videogame 
market, poses a challenge to the implementation of competition policy (e.g., Gal and Waller, 
2012). Among high-technology industries, the videogame industry is receiving great attention 
from researchers. Besides the fact that it is an increasingly revenue-generating business,3 the 
industry’s features make it an interesting field of application for both theoretical and 
empirical research.4 On the theoretical side, this industry is a fertile area of study for theories 
of platform competition (and console pricing in particular5) and issues related to vertical 
relationships (in particular on the role of integration and exclusivity contracts between 
console platforms and software developers). On the empirical side, this industry provides data 
                                                 
1
 This is for instance the case of a recent retrospective study by Ashenfelter et al. (2013), which analyzes the 
effects of the Maytag-Whirlpool merger. Other retrospective studies are instead motivated by the need for 
antitrust agencies to inform their decision-making in key sectors where merger analysis raises issues that are 
largely industry-specific. An example of such studies is Aguzzoni et al. (2013), which quantifies the effect of a 
merger in the book retail sector, with a methodology that could be applied to other retailing markets. 
2
 “Game Group PLC and Games Station Limited: A report on the completed acquisition by Game Group PLC of 
Games Station Limited”, 16th of January 2008, pp. 30-31. 
3
 Lee (2102) reports that 69% of US heads of households engage in computer and videogames. Engelstatter and 
Ward (2013) report figures for the US whereby sales of videogames have doubled over the last decade and now 
reach 10 billion dollars annually.  
4
 Lee (2012) provides a nice and comprehensive survey of this literature. 
5
 For instance, Hagiu (2006) studies the interactions between the hardware price and the royalty rates that 
consoles charge to software developers.  
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for the estimation of network effects and for the quantification of the role of exclusivity and 
integration.6 
 Our study of the effects resulting from the merger between Game and Gamestation 
tries to encompass most of the peculiar features of the videogame industry. Our analysis 
focuses on the effect of the merger on prices, which are perceived to be the most important 
purchasing criterion for these products. To evaluate the impact of the merger on the prices of 
new and pre-owned games, we perform a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis, in which 
we take the merging parties as the treatment group and their competitors as the control group, 
as is common in the literature on ex-post assessments (e.g., McCabe, 2002; Ashenfelter and 
Hosken, 2011). 
Because of the dissent between the CC’s members at the time of the decision on 
whether new – also referred to as “mint” – and pre-owned games belonged to the same 
market, we run separate empirical analyses for these two categories of games. Moreover, to 
encompass the fundamental role of the relationship between hardware and software in this 
industry, we also perform heterogeneous treatment effects estimations in order to assess 
whether the effect of the merger differs depending on the console to which the game belongs. 
Finally, we also test whether the price effect of the merger differs across retailers. 
Overall, the results of our econometric analysis suggest that there has been a reduction 
in the general price level both for mint and for pre-owned games after the merger. Our results 
show that this decline has been more marked for the merging parties suggesting that the 
merger between Game and Gamestation did not lead to a substantial lessening of competition, 
neither in the mint nor in the pre-owned segment of the market. Hence, we conclude that the 
CC took the appropriate decision when it approved the merger. The result that the merging 
parties’ prices decreased more than the competitors’ prices is consistent with the merger 
creating efficiency gains. Survey-based evidence, which we obtained by interviewing market 
participants, suggests that the merger increased the parties’ efficiency and, in particular, their 
ability to obtain better terms from publishers and manufacturers (Aguzzoni et al., 2011). 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the characteristics of the 
videogames industry and the merger. In section 3 we present our empirical methodology for 
assessing the effect of the merger. Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5 we highlight our 
main results and describe additional robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
                                                 
6
 See Clements and Ohashi (2005) and Corts and Lederman (2009) on the evaluation of indirect network effects, 
and Lee (2013) on the impact of integration and exclusivity. 
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2. The Videogame Industry and the Merger 
A videogame is an electronic game for which the player uses a controller (e.g. joystick) to 
interact with the game in order to generate visual feedback on the screen. Games are played 
on some sort of platform, generally a PC or a gaming console. The UK videogame market is 
worth between £2 and £3 billion in 2006, and is the third largest market in the world after the 
US and Japan.7 Although the size of the market had increased significantly before the merger, 
the sales in this industry have always been highly volatile, since sale patterns tend to follow 
the release of new consoles, and historically sale cycles have been observed. 
Like other creative goods, individual releases of videogames have short lifecycles. Lee 
(2012, p.6) reports that “typically half of a games lifetime sales occur within the first 3 
months of release, and very rarely do games continue to sell well more than half a year from 
release”. Following the decline in demand over time, prices generally tend to decrease some 
time after the release date.8 
Console manufacturers, game developers and publishers sit at the top of the supply 
chain of videogames. The manufacturers design the consoles and, together with the other two 
players, create the games. Consoles and games are then sold to retailers and distributors. 
At the time of the merger several types of retailers were selling gaming products in the 
UK: specialist retailers (e.g., Game, Gamestation); non-specialist entertainment retailers, 
including music and video retailers (e.g., HMV, Blockbuster); high-street general retailers 
(e.g., Argos, Woolworths), supermarkets, electrical goods retailers (e.g., Currys); and online 
retailers (e.g., Amazon, Play.com, Internet operations for the bricks and mortar retailers, and 
online auctions sites). 
Retailers typically sell mint videogames, consoles and related accessories. In addition 
there are also considerable sales of pre-owned products, as consumers tend to re-sell their 
games and consoles when they grow tired of them, or when they decide to upgrade to a 
different console. Some of these transactions are carried out privately or through auction sites. 
Alternatively, consumers go to specialist retailers, who may offer cash or credit against 
purchases (mostly only for games). This latter option is called trade-in and is the main means 
for specialist retailers to acquire stocks of pre-owned products. 
                                                 
7
 “Game Group PLC and Games Station Limited: A report on the completed acquisition by Game Group PLC of 
Games Station Limited”, January 16, 2008, p. 8. 
8
 Nair (2007) provides an explanation of such pricing strategy that is based on intertemporal price discrimination. 
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2.1 The Merger 
On May 2, 2007 Game acquired Gamestation, one of its main competitors. The UK Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) referred the merger to the CC in August 2007. The CC’s decision was 
published on January 18, 2008. Game is a specialist retailer of new and pre-owned 
videogames, consoles and related accessories. As of January 31, 2007 it had 817 stores 
around the world; 395 of which were in the UK, all in primary locations, such as shopping 
centres and high streets. Gamestation is also a specialist retailer of new and pre-owned 
videogames, consoles and related accessories. Before the merger, it operated 217 stores, 
solely in the UK. Unlike Game, Gamestation had stores in secondary locations, which were 
close to prime retail sites, but did not involve the payment of premium rents. According to the 
parties, the merger would have allowed Game to extend its customer reach. It would have also 
generated pre-tax synergies, mainly as a result of reduced overheads, improved use of 
distribution infrastructure, more efficient management of pre-owned product, and improved 
sourcing. The transaction had also a defensive rationale in view of Game’s declining market 
share in the years preceding the merger.9 
The preliminary step of the CC’s assessment was the definition of the relevant market. 
The CC concluded that mint and pre-owned products were in the same product market.  
However, since the evidence was not so clear-cut, the analysis of the possible effects of the 
mergers was performed also assuming that mint and pre-owned games were two separate 
markets.10 The CC also concluded that different types of retailers do not form distinct 
markets. The CC agreed with the parties’ view that in the gaming retail sector there are three 
different product segments: consoles, software (i.e. games), and peripherals. The CC 
concluded that each segment included both new and pre-owned products.  
As for the geographic market definition, the analysis conducted by the CC provided 
little evidence in favour of local markets. The scope of local pricing policies proved to be 
limited. In addition, significant elements of competition occurred at national level, such as 
                                                 
9
 Generalist retailers had experienced declining market shares in the five years preceding the merger. Instead, 
supermarkets and internet retailers seem to have increased their market share (“Game Group PLC and Games 
Station Limited: A report on the completed acquisition by Game Group PLC of Games Station Limited”, 
January 16, 2008, p. 8). 
10
 Any decision by the CC whether to approve or block a merger must be approved by a group of five 
commissioners. In this case two felt that the evidence collected was not sufficient to argue that the prices of mint 
games constrained the prices of pre-owned ones. The merger was anyway cleared because three commissioners 
agreed with overall conclusions. Nevertheless we consider this concern in our ex-post analysis. 
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Internet sales by the parties and their competitors as well as advertising campaigns. The CC 
concluded that the relevant geographic market was national. 
The main effect of the merger was to increase concentration in the retail supply of 
gaming products, by removing one of the two large national gaming specialist retailers as an 
independent competitor. To assess whether the merger could lead to a price increase in the 
affected markets, the CC considered whether enough marginal customers would have 
switched to other providers in order to prevent such rises from being successfully 
implemented. Hence, it examined the existence of barriers to switching between different 
retailers, the degree of customers’ mobility, and price sensitivity. Given that the product 
market definition was not clear-cut, the analysis was performed separately for mint and for 
pre-owned products.  
As for mint products, the CC found that many customers viewed Game and 
Gamestation as the best alternative to each other in this segment. Nonetheless, several 
considerations led the CC to conclude that there was not much scope for price increases. 
Customer surveys, run at the time of the inquiry, revealed that many customers bought 
gaming products from a variety of suppliers, which was consistent with customers switching 
easily between retailers. These surveys also showed that consumers considered price as the 
most important factor in their purchasing decisions. These results suggested that consumers 
would change retailer in response to marginal changes in relative prices. Also, price 
information was easily available from various sources. For instance, latest releases and chart 
games were widely advertised. In addition, prices could be checked on gaming discussion 
websites, in magazines, on the Internet, as well as by visiting supermarkets and high street 
stores. 
With regard to pre-owned products, the parties’ market shares were even higher than 
for mint, and surveys indicated that they were often named as each other’s closest competitor. 
Nevertheless, the CC found that there was not much scope for a price increase for several 
reasons. First of all, even though fewer retailers offered pre-owned products compared to mint 
ones, consumers also had other options to the merging parties. Several bricks and mortar 
retailers (e.g., Blockbuster, independent specialists) and online retailers (e.g., Amazon, 
Play.com, and eBay) also sold pre-owned products. These were also available at second hand 
and exchange shops, as well as at car boot sales. Moreover, in the two years prior to the 
merger, the online sector had developed with online purchases of pre-owned products 
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expanding. Further, the after-sale services offered by online retailers had improved. Finally, 
the consumer surveys undertaken during the inquiry showed that consumers were responsive 
to relative price changes and switched easily between retailers.  
The CC also considered whether there were barriers to entry and expansion that could 
allow the merger to create unilateral effects on competition. With regard to mint products, the 
CC concluded that neither the barriers to entry, nor the barriers to expansion were high. With 
regard to pre-owned and trade-in business, the CC concluded that mint products exerted a 
constraint on the retail prices for pre-owned games, in virtue of their substitutability. As a 
result, even if entry in the pre-owned segment was unlikely, ease of entry/expansion in the 
mint segment would act as a constraint also on the prices for pre-owned products.  
Finally, the CC analysed whether the merger was likely to increase the parties’ buyer 
power to the detriment of competitors. It concluded that the increased size of the merged 
entity allowed it to negotiate better terms, but that the discount rates it was expected to 
achieve were unlikely to reduce the rivals’ ability to compete. In addition, these expected 
reductions in cost could be passed on to consumers. With regard to suppliers, manufacturers 
are generally large multinational corporations selling all over the world, for which the UK 
accounts only for a fraction of their sales. The CC considered that this constrained the parties’ 
buyer power. Moreover, the CC did not expect the merger to cause negative effects on 
investment and innovation by suppliers since very little product development is UK-specific. 
The same considerations, albeit to a lesser extent, were also made for software publishers, 
which also tend to be large international firms. 
The CC concluded that the merger was not expected to result in a substantial lessening 
of competition in the markets for the supply of gaming software, consoles and peripherals to 
consumers in the UK. 
 
3. The Empirical strategy 
Our analysis aims at evaluating the effects of the Game/Gamestation merger on the retail 
market for gaming products in the UK. Since the CC mainly focused on the market for mint 
and pre-owned software, we also concentrate on this market.11 In addition, as previously 
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 This is probably due to the fact that the margins on hardware (i.e. consoles) seem to be narrower and 
competition fiercer than for software. Indeed, most of the CC’s analysis concerned the likely effect of the merger 
on the software segment (and in particular on pre-owned games).  
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mentioned, given the disagreements within the CC with regard to whether mint and pre-
owned games belonged to the same market, we run separate empirical analyses for mint and 
pre-owned games. 
The key variable in our empirical study is the price at which these games are sold, 
which is the main factor consumers consider when making their purchasing decisions. To 
assess the impact of the merger, we perform a DiD analysis with the merging parties as the 
treatment group and their competitors as the control group. This identification strategy is 
widely used in retrospective studies where alternative control groups are not available 
because, for instance, competition is national in scope and one cannot exploit variations in 
local market conditions.12 The main advantage of using this control group is that it enables 
one to separate the effects of the merger from any factors affecting demand or costs that are 
common to all firms in the market. As Ashenfelter et al. (2013) thoroughly discuss, if the 
merging parties raise their prices after the merger and prices are strategic complements, their 
rivals shall react by increasing their own prices as well in the post-merger equilibrium. This 
effect takes place under a variety of market conditions and, in particular in the differentiated 
product Bertrand model. Moreover, for a large class of demand systems, Deneckere and 
Davidson (1985) show that the merging firms change their prices after the merger by a greater 
amount than their rivals, which delivers the identification of the merger effect.13  
Yet, using the competitors as a control group has its own disadvantages as the 
competitors’ prices may also be affected by the merger and, therefore, they may not fully 
reflect the counterfactual scenario that would have occurred absent the merger. Hence, our 
identification strategy does not allow for estimating the full causal effects of the merger, but 
rather it only enables the identification of the direction of its competitive effect. The merger 
might be seen as market power enhancing if the prices of the merging parties increase more 
than those of their competitors, while it might be seen as efficiency enhancing if the merging 
parties’ prices decrease more than those of their competitors. 
In our main model, we estimate the change in prices on a set of games using 
observations from the pre-merger and the post-merger period. Therefore the general equation 
that we estimate is: 
                                                 
12
 Ashenfelter and Hosken (2011) employ a similar control group to analyse the price effects of five mergers, and 
McCabe (2002) employs it to study the price effects of mergers in the market for academic journals. 
13
 In this model, the extent to which rivals increase their prices depends on how quickly demand elasticities 
increase with prices (see Crooke et al, 2003).   
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where Priceijnt is the price of game i charged by retailer j for console n14 at time t, αj
 
and µn 
represent respectively a retailer and a console fixed-effect,15 postt is a dummy equal to 1 for 
the games observed in the post-merger period and 0 before, while mergedj is a dummy equal 
to 1 for the merging parties and 0 for the others,  is a set of control variables based on the 
characteristics of the games (see subsection 4.1 for a description of the control variables used 
in the specification), and εijnt is the error term, which we assume to be correlated among 
games within the same console as customers are often segmented between different console. 
The interaction between the variables mergedj  and postt takes the value 1 for the games sold 
by the merging parties in the post-merger period and 0 otherwise. 
We estimate this equation separately for mint and for pre-owned products. Hence, 
Priceijnt  can either refer to the prices of mint games or of pre-owned ones. Our key parameter 
of interest is the interaction coefficient δ, which quantifies the additional variation 
experienced by the prices of the two merging parties after the merger with respect to the 
average price change of their competitors across all retailers. The average price change in the 
market after the merger is captured by the coefficient β. 
Besides estimating the average effect of the merger on prices, we also assess whether 
the merger's effect differs along relevant dimensions of heterogeneity in the product 
characteristics. First, since the console (hardware) is the platform on which games (software) 
can be played, the console market and the market for games are linked by indirect network 
effects.16 Therefore, we consider it appropriate to evaluate whether the merger produced 
different price effects depending on the consoles. Subsection 5.2 presents the results of the 
heterogeneous treatment effects estimation by console, in which we verify whether the price 
changes show a different pattern across consoles (i.e., we estimate a different coefficient βn 
for each console) and whether the additional variation experienced by the prices of the two 
                                                 
14
 A game is identified both by the title and the console. For example, FIFA 10 for Xbox and FIFA10 for PS3 are 
two different games. 
15
 We run a regression with fixed-effects for each retailer and each console, so as to capture all the time-invariant 
retailer-specific and console-specific (unobserved and observed) characteristics that may affect prices. 
16
 Indirect network effects arise because consumer valuation for a console indirectly depends on the number of 
other players using the same console, since the larger the customer base, the larger the variety of games that are 
likely to be developed for that platform. 
)(1ijntitjtnjijnt XpostmergedpostPrice εγδβµα +⋅+×⋅+⋅++=
iX
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merging parties differs across consoles (i.e., we estimate a different interaction coefficient δn 
for each console). 
Second, since there are different categories of retailers in this market (specialist, non-
specialist, online, etc.), we assess whether the price changes varied across retailers and use 
this information to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. This analysis allows us to assess 
whether the effect of the merger differs by category of retailers (e.g., specialist vs. online) and 
whether the two merging parties reacted differently to the merger. As a first step, we estimate 
the price change before and after the merger for each retailer separately. This entails 
estimating a new regression with a different coefficient βj for each retailer. These effects 
represent the retailer-specific price change after the merger if compared to the average market 
price before the merger. As a second step, we take the difference between each of these 
coefficients βj and the coefficient estimate for Games and Gamestation. These essentially 
represent different DiD estimators and they allow us to identify two heterogeneous treatment 
effects: (βj – βGames) and (βj –βGamestation). 
4. Data and Sample Selection 
To perform our analysis, we put together a dataset that provides two comparable snapshots of 
the prices of the merging parties and their main competitors before and after the merger. As 
discussed in section 2, videogames, like other creative goods, become obsolete very quickly, 
and the price that consumers are willing to pay for a specific title quickly decreases. This 
implies that it is inappropriate to track the exact same titles before and after the merger to 
assess its causal effect on prices, because the same titles over time are different products from 
the point of view of the consumers. For this reason, rather than using the same titles before 
and after the merger, we compare the prices of different videogames with very similar 
characteristics. Any difference in these characteristics can be controlled for by using a 
hedonic price approach, in which prices are expressed as a function of the characteristics of 
the videogames that we believe have an impact on prices.17   
Since we could not find data on both mint and pre-owned prices from any commercial 
sources for the pre-merger period, we rely on the information collected by the CC. Hence, we 
use a set of price data submitted by the merging parties during the inquiry, which the CC 
employed for the definition of the relevant product market. This set contains information on 
                                                 
17
 Ashenfelter et al. (2013) and Aguzzoni et al. (2013) adopt the same methodology for the appliance market and 
for the book market respectively. 
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the mint and pre-owned prices charged by nine UK retailers between August and October 
2007 on 196 titles. The 196 titles belong to six different consoles.18  
The main issue with this sample of pre-merger videogame titles is that we do not know 
how they were originally selected. Yet, since we know that the data were provided by Game, 
we assume that the pre-merger titles reflected Game’s most relevant sales (i.e. best-selling 
titles) across the various consoles. Hence, for the post-merger period we select a new set of 
titles on the basis of Game’s best-selling charts.19 For each console, we select the same 
number of games as in the pre-merger dataset. The only exceptions are the games for PS2 and 
PS3 consoles, for which we invert the number of titles selected. This choice hinges on a 
number of considerations. First, at the time of the merger PS3 had just been released20 and, 
consequently, a lower range of titles was available in comparison to its predecessor. In the 
post-merger period, the situation is reversed, since there are more titles available for the PS3 
console than for the PS2 one. Second, the PS3 console is designed to be retro-compatible with 
PS2 games, thus making it more likely for players to switch to the new console as they would 
still be able to play their old PS2 games. 
We notice that the share of games bundled with an accessory is higher in the post-
merger set of titles than in the pre-merger one, particularly for the Nintendo Wii. Given that a 
bundle is more expensive than a standalone game, we also record the price of the standalone 
game, when it is possible to find it. This allows us to adjust for any possible distortions to the 
level of the prices caused by the higher number of bundles. Consequently, the final post-
merger sample includes 6 more games, 202 in total (as the same title sold in a bundled or 
standalone counts as two games).21 
We then collected the prices for the mint and the pre-owned versions of these titles 
across the same retailers that were included in original dataset (Amazon, ASDA, CeX, eBay, 
                                                 
18
 These 196 titles are distributed as follows: 33 titles are for Xbox 360, 23 for Wii, 31 for DS, 21 for PlayStation 
3 (“PS3”), 64 for PlayStation 2 (“PS2”) and 24 for PlayStation Portable (“PSP”). 
19
 More precisely, we employ the charts published on Game’s website on May 10, 2010. In Appendix 1 we 
report the full list of titles that we use in our analysis. 
20
 PS3 was released on March 23, 2007. 
21
 These 202 titles are distributed as follows: 33 titles for Xbox 360, 26 for Wii, 31 for DS, 66 for PlayStation 3, 
21 for PlayStation 2 and 25 for PlayStation Portable. All titles included in the dataset are listed in the appendix. 
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Game, Gamestation,22 HMV, Play.com and Tesco). The price data were collected through 
these retailers’ websites.23 
Not all retailers sell both mint and pre-owned games. Hence, for Game, Gamestation 
and Play.com we could obtain data both on mint and pre-owned prices, while for CeX only on 
pre-owned prices, and for ASDA, Tesco and HMV only on mint prices. Amazon UK sells 
mint games both directly and as a platform connecting buyers and sellers (Amazon 
Marketplace), while it offers pre-owned titles only as a platform. We have only recorded 
Amazon’s mint price (only if it did not offer the title, we included the cheapest price on offer 
through Amazon Marketplace) and the cheapest pre-owned price for the game in used like 
new condition offered on Amazon Marketplace. With respect to eBay, even though it offers 
both mint and pre-owned games, for each title we only included the price for the cheapest 
item in sealed mint condition available now and sold by a UK seller since pre-owned prices 
were not recorded in the pre-merger dataset. When buyers were charged for the delivery of 
the game, which happens rarely, we have added the delivery charge to the price to generate 
our Price variables.24 
To minimize any potential bias due to the sample selection, we check whether the 
results of our analysis are not sensitive to the way in which we have built the post-merger 
sample. For this reason, we test the robustness of our main results by performing a set of 
additional regressions using some alternative samples of titles, which are described in detail in 
section 5.4. Our results appear to be robust to these sample selection issues. 
4.1. The Control Variables 
We include in our dataset a large set of game-specific control variables, which include 
information on: time elapsed from release, degree of vertical integration in the supply chain, 
identity of developer and publisher, genre, possibility of online playing, whether the game is 
                                                 
22
 Game and Gamestation kept distinct branding after the merger. 
23
 We acknowledge that in some cases retailers charge prices for on-line sales different from prices charged for 
in-store sales. However, we run some random checks by calling shops and were told that on average prices in 
shops are the same as on the website. 
24
 Game, Gamestation, Play.com, ASDA, Tesco, HMV and CeX do not apply any charge for delivery to their 
online customers. Amazon UK does not charge delivery for the games it sells directly whilst those sold through 
Amazon Marketplace may require the payment of shipment costs. Similarly, products sold on eBay may involve 
the payment of a delivery charge. 
14 
 
bundled with accessories, press rating, and whether the game is part of a series or family of 
games.25  
The decision on which variables to include as controls is based on the findings of the 
empirical literature on this industry, as well as on our consideration on what appeared to be 
relevant features of the games that affect demand and supply, hence that are likely to impact 
prices. For instance, Nair (2007) and Hernandez-Mireles et al. (2008) indicate the age of a 
game as a key variable in determining the pattern of its price over time. Hence, we build a 
variable (days release) that displays the age of each game in terms of the number of days 
elapsed from its release up to the day in which its price is registered. For the pre-merger 
sample we calculate the age of each title from its release up to October 31, 2007, whilst for 
the post-merger sample we calculate the age of each game from its release up to May 20, 
2010. 
Several papers outline the impact of the degree of vertical integration between 
developers, publishers and consoles on the prices of games. For instance, Gil and Warzynski 
(2009) find evidence of higher prices for integrated games, because of better release periods 
and improved post-release marketing strategies. Therefore, for each title in our datasets, we 
collect information on the identity of the developer, the publisher, and the console 
manufacturer. We then control for different degrees of vertical integration by introducing two 
dummies (IntPubDev and IntPubDevMan): the former reveals if the publisher of the game is 
also its developer, while the latter tells if the publisher coincides with both the developer and 
the console manufacturer. 
In order to control for quality differences among producers and developers that might 
affect prices, we introduce a set of dummy variables for the 10 publishers and the 11 
developers that appear frequently in the sample.26  
To be consistent with the existing literature, we also include the genre of each game as 
a control variable (e.g., Hernandez-Mireles et al. 2008). For simplicity, we aggregate all titles 
into seven categories: 1) action, 2) simulation, 3) sports, 4) adventure, 5) shooter, 6) 
interactive, and 7) role play games (RPG). This aggregation is done following two criteria. 
                                                 
25
 All the information used to build the control variables is taken from IGN Entertainment UK and from Game’s 
website. 
26
 We do not include a full set of dummies for all developers and publishers since they would be too many. For 
most of them, the limited number of observations would not allow us to consistently estimate the fixed-effects. 
For this reason, we choose to include a dummy only for the top 10 publishers and developers. Due to a tie, the 
number of dummies for the developers is actually 11. 
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First, we calculate the frequency of different types of games in the sample, considering the 
categorization indicated on the game itself. Then, where possible because of common 
characteristics, we group the least frequent genres into wider categories. We then introduce in 
the regression a set of seven dummies, each referring to one of these categories.  
Another distinct feature of some games is that they allow the user to play them 
remotely with other users. This feature enhances the value of the game. We collected 
information on whether the games included in our samples has this characteristic and create a 
variable (online), which equals 1 if online gaming is possible and 0 if not. 
We consider if a game is sold with an accessory, through the variable (bundle). This is 
equal to 1 if the game is bundled with an accessory and 0 if not. We also account for the 
rating given to a game by newspapers and specialist magazines at the time of its release 
because this is likely to affect the valuation of consumers. To this end we introduce the 
variable (press), which ranges from 0 to 10 (worst to best). Further, we control for whether a 
game is part of a series/saga or not, as the pricing of these games may follow different 
dynamics. In particular, it may reflect the fact that buyers of these games are more captive 
and, therefore, they tend to attribute a higher value to them. The variable (PartofSeries) 
equals 1 when a game is part of a series/saga and 0 otherwise.27 
In Table 1 we present the descriptive statistics for the quantitative variables employed 
in the estimation separately for the two sub-samples of pre-merger and post-merger games.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Pre-merger, the average price for mint games, once adjusted for inflation, is £26.80, 
while for pre-owned games is £22.14. Post-merger, these drop to £23.30 and £17.31, 
respectively. This first descriptive result of this study is therefore that there was a substantial 
average price reduction after the merger.  The average number of days elapsing between the 
release of the game and the recording of the price data is 285 for the pre-merger titles and 326 
for the post-merger titles. As far as vertical integration is concerned, 42% of the games are 
from the same publisher and developer, while for only 8% of the games there is full 
integration between publisher, developer and manufacturer pre-merger. The figures post-
merger are similar: 38% and 10%, respectively. Pre-merger, 22% of the games included in the 
study allow online playing while post-merger this holds for 24% of the games. Pre-merger 4% 
                                                 
27
 The variable PartofSeries tries to capture an attribute that may give a different value to a game. It is important 
to stress that this variable takes value 1 for all games belonging to a series, regardless of whether they are present 
in both the pre-merger and the post-merger sample or not.   
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and post-merger 6% of the games are bundled with accessories. Pre-merger, 78% of the 
games are part of a series/saga and this figure drops to 71% post-merger. Finally, the average 
press rating for the games in the estimation sample is 6.90 pre-merger and 7.47 post-merger.  
5. Results  
In this section we present the main findings of our econometric analysis. We illustrate the 
results of the DiD analysis for mint and for pre-owned games separately. We also present the 
results by retailer and by console, to more clearly assess the heterogeneity of the pre-post 
price change across retailer chains or across consoles. 
5.1. Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
In Table 2 we present the results of the DiD analysis, based on equation (1) above. We run 
separate regressions for mint and pre-owned games. The fact that customers are segmented 
between different console-users generates a potential covariance between disturbances in the 
prices of different games for the same console. Thus, we cluster the errors at the console level. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The results presented in column (1) show that the average reduction in prices for mint 
games is significantly more marked for Game and Gamestation than for the other retailers. In 
particular, the estimates suggest an average reduction of £3.58, with an additional reduction of 
£5.05 for the merging parties. Similarly, the results for pre-owned games show that the 
reduction in prices in the post-merger period was more marked for Game and Gamestation 
than for the other sellers of pre-owned titles. Indeed, the estimates suggest an average 
decrease of £4.66, with an extra reduction of £4.52 for the merging parties (the average pre-
merger price was £23.40).28 
The control variables included in the regression are mostly significant and have the 
expected signs. In particular the average price of a game is higher if the game is part of a 
series, if its press rating at time of release was high, if it is bundled with an accessory and if it 
allows on-line gaming. On the other hand, the longer the time that elapsed since the release of 
a game, the lower its price. The integration between publishers and developers appears to 
have a negative effect on prices, while complete vertical integration (i.e. also with the 
                                                 
28
 The significance of these results is confirmed when we cluster the errors at the retailer level. 
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manufacturers) produces a positive effect on prices, yet both coefficients are not statistically 
significant at standard confidence levels.29 
Overall, the results presented in Table 2 show a reduction in prices both for mint and 
pre-owned games. This reduction is significantly more pronounced for the merging parties, 
which suggests that the merger did not produce any negative effects on consumer welfare, at 
least in terms of prices. Following Deneckere and Davidson (1985), we can conclude that the 
fact that the merging parties reduce prices more than their competitors suggests that the 
merger brought efficiency gains to the merging parties. Indeed, if the efficiency gains are 
large enough to compensate for the market power effect, the merged firm may have an 
incentive to reduce prices.30 In a model where firms compete à la Bertrand, the rivals react by 
decreasing prices too, since they are strategic complements, but by a lower amount than the 
merged firm. The post-merger equilibrium predicted by this merger model with large enough 
efficiency gains is one in which (1) prices are lower than in the pre-merger situation; and (2) 
the merged firms’ prices are lower than those of their competitors.  
In this specific case, we do not have enough information to quantitatively assess the 
magnitude of the potential efficiency gains. The parties claimed that the merger would have 
generated synergies, but in the decision there was no evaluation of the possible efficiency 
gains brought about by the merger. There was only a reference to possible cost savings due to 
increased buyer power: “the parties would be able to negotiate much better buying terms than 
competitors, which would give them a marked cost advantage allowing them to undercut 
competitors (…)” (par. 7.98 of the CC decision), even though the likelihood of this effect was 
not clear-cut. Evidence from a survey of market participants that we run some years after the 
merger suggests that the merger might have increased the parties’ ability to obtain better 
conditions from publishers and manufacturers, as well as their overall efficiency.31 
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the data. In particular, we examine more 
closely the price reduction spurred by the merger, by looking at the price evolution by console 
and for each retailer.    
 
                                                 
29
 In the specifications with errors clustered at the retailer level or at the retailer-console level, the coefficient 
representing the effect on prices of the integration between publishers and developers becomes significant at the 
5% level, which might suggest the existence of efficiencies from vertical integration that are passed on to final 
consumers. 
30
 See Motta (2004), chapter 4. 
31
 See Aguzzoni et al. (2011, section 6.3.3) for further details. 
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5.2. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Console 
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis by console, in which we verify whether the 
reduction in prices shows a different pattern across consoles (column (1) and column (2)) and 
whether the additional variation experienced by the prices of the two merging parties differs 
across consoles (column (3) and column (4)).   
[Table 3 about here] 
Two interesting features emerge from our findings. The first is that there is a clear 
dividing line between the pattern of games’ prices for portable and non-portable consoles, as 
the latter exhibit a stronger decline compared to the former (Nintendo DS and PlayStation 
Portable) for the average retailer.32 The second feature is that the more limited price reduction 
for PlayStation 2 among the non-portable consoles, whose market share was dramatically 
shrinking during the relevant period.  
The results for the interaction coefficients, which capture the change in the merging 
parties’ prices relative to those of the other retailers, i.e. the heterogeneous treatment effect, 
suggest that the reduction in prices is significantly higher for the merging parties across all 
consoles. The additional mint price reduction for the merging parties ranges from £2.46 for 
PlayStation Portable to £7.11 for the PlayStation 3, while the additional pre-owned price 
reduction for the merging parties ranges from £1.68 for PSP to £9.49 for the Xbox. Moreover, 
the observed decline in mint games’ prices for two consoles, PlayStation 2 and Nintendo DS, 
seems to be entirely driven by the pricing behaviour of Game and Gamestation.  
5.3. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Retailer 
Table 4 presents the results based on the specifications in which we estimate the effect on 
prices before and after the merger separately for each retailer.33 Columns (1) and (4) report 
these estimates for mint games and pre-owned games respectively. We then use these 
estimates to perform two DiD analyses by comparing the coefficients estimates, i.e. the post-
merger price change, of each of the competitor retailers with the coefficients estimates of 
                                                 
32
 The average mint and pre-owned prices for Nintendo DS are £23.70 and £19.60 respectively, while the 
average mint and pre-owned prices for all other consoles are £27.40 and £22.60 respectively. Given the 
coefficient estimates and these average prices, both the absolute and the percentage post-merger price variation 
for Nintendo DS are always smaller than for all other consoles. 
33
 To simplify the table we only included the coefficients measuring the post-merger effect for each retailer, 
while omitting the coefficients for the control variables. They are in line with the findings described in the basic 
DiD regressions reported in Table 2. Furthermore, we did not have enough information on prices for both mint 
and pre-owned games for all retailers and, therefore, we could not estimate some of the interaction coefficients. 
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Game and Gamestation, respectively. Columns (2) and (3) report the results for mint games 
while columns (5) and (6) report the results for pre-owned games. 
For mint games, we first observe that the estimated coefficient sign is negative for 
each post-merger-retailer interaction, which means that all retailers experienced a price 
reduction after the merger. However, the coefficients for E-bay, Play.com, and Tesco are not 
significant, while the most significant reduction is experienced by the merging parties and is 
slightly higher for Gamestation.  This latter result is then reflected in the findings of the DiD 
estimates reported in columns (2) and (3). The post-merger price reduction by Games and 
Gamestation is significantly larger if compared to the price reduction of ASDA (£4.58 and 
£5.82, respectively), E-bay (£6.28 and £7.52, respectively), Play.com (£6.79 and £8.03, 
respectively), and Tesco (£6.53 and £7.77, respectively). The difference of the price change 
between Game and Gamestation is, instead, not significant.34 
[Table 4 about here] 
When we look at the pre-owned games, we observe a very similar picture. Again, the 
sign of the coefficient estimate for the retailer-specific post-merger interaction is significantly 
negative for all retailers (column (4)). The most significant reduction is estimated for Game 
and Gamestation, and again the difference between the two coefficients’ estimates is not 
significant. The price reduction for the merging party is, however, significantly larger than for 
Amazon (£4.20 and £4.10 respectively), CeX (£5.21 and £5.10 respectively), and Play.com 
(£4.17 and £4.07 respectively).  
5.4. Robustness Checks 
Since we could not verify how exactly the pre-merger titles were selected, we check whether 
the results of the econometric analysis may be driven by a potential selection bias. To do so, 
we build a number of alternative post-merger datasets based on a different selection of titles, 
and we re-run all regressions on these alternative sets. Below we describe these alternative 
samples of titles. 
A first source of potential bias could derive from the fact that the post-merger sample 
is based on the same consoles’ market shares (in terms of software sales) of the pre-merger 
sample, the only difference being the inversion between the numbers of titles for PS2 and 
PS3. For this reason, we construct another sample in which the number of titles per console 
                                                 
34
 We also tried to use the average effect between Game and Gamestation as a counterfactual. Given that the 
coefficients estimates are very similar, the qualitative results reported in columns (2) and (3) do not change. 
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reflects their market shares, in terms of software sales, as reported in the Entertainment 
Retailers Association’s 2010 yearbook.35 Of course, the sample size is different from the 
original one. 
It is also possible that the pre-merger titles were representative of the consoles’ market 
shares in terms of Game’s software sales, and not of aggregate sales. Hence, we construct 
another sample in which the post-merger titles are selected reflecting the distribution of the 
consoles market shares relative to Game’s sales.36 For the pre-merger data, we keep the 
original distribution, but we reduce the number of titles in order to have the same number of 
titles pre and post-merger.37 
A third potential source of selection bias might be that the pre-merger titles reflect the 
overall top-selling titles and not only Game’s best-selling list. In order to account for this 
possibility, we build an additional sample in which, out of the selected post-merger titles, we 
keep only those titles that appear in ELSPA’s best-selling chart for the week 10-17 of May 
2010.38 About half of the titles originally selected are also in this chart.39 
A further potential problem might be related to the fact that the post-merger data 
contains a relatively higher number of bundles, which are more expensive. This is mainly due 
to the fact that the console Nintendo Wii, for which bundles are more frequent, increased its 
sales over time. For this reason, we construct a sub-sample in which we exclude all titles that 
were bundled with accessories both from the pre and post-merger sets. 
Finally, we also select an additional sample in which we include only those titles that 
belong to a series. Since the number of titles that satisfy these criteria is small, we adopt a 
broader definition of series and treat those titles that are different episodes of a given saga as 
belonging to the same series.40 The underlying idea of this robustness check is to create a 
sample of titles pre- and post- merger as homogenous as possible. 
                                                 
35
 We use the 2009 market shares for the selection of the post-merger titles, as these were the most recent 
available. In addition, for the sake of uniformity we adjust both the pre-merger and the post-merger sample using 
the Entertainment Retailers Association’s 2010 yearbook data on market shares.  
36
 The distribution of the consoles market shares relative to Game’s sales as of May 10, 2010. 
37
 Contrary to the previous case, we cannot apply the correction both to the pre-merger and the post-merger 
samples, because we do not have data on Game’s software sales before the merger. 
38
 ELSPA is the UK Entertainment and Leisure Software Publishers' Association, which was established in 1989 
by videogame software publishers. This is now known as the UKIE, the UK Interactive Entertainment 
Association. 
39
 In this case, we also cannot apply the correction to both the pre-merger and the post-merger samples, because 
we do not have the data for the pre-merger period. 
40
 FIFA is a good example of a series. The game is basically the same in the various versions, as only the name 
of the players and some features change. Harry Potter is a saga because the adventures change in each episode, 
and so does the game, but some of the features, e.g., the characters, remain the same. 
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In Table 5 we present the results of these robustness checks for the prices of mint 
games.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Column (1) shows the results when the number of titles per console in the post-merger 
sample reflects the consoles’ market shares in terms of aggregate software sales in 2009, 
rather the same shares as in the pre-merger sample. The results obtained are not different in 
qualitative terms. As before, the estimated coefficients show a significant decline in prices in 
the post-merger period, which is stronger for the merging parties. In terms of magnitude of 
the estimated coefficients, if we compare the results in column (1) of Table 5 with those in 
column (1) of Table 2, we find that the estimate of the interaction effect with the revised 
sample of titles is slightly lower.  
Column (2) presents the results obtained when we used a sample in which the post-
merger data reflect the distribution of the consoles market shares for Game’s sales. The 
results are substantially unchanged.  
In column (3) we show the results when the two samples of titles include only those 
that appear in the ELSPA general best-selling chart. These too show a significant reduction in 
prices, which is stronger for the merging parties. In column (4) we present the results when 
the estimation is done on samples that exclude all games sold in bundles. The results confirm 
that there is a decrease in price after the merger, which is significantly stronger for Game and 
Gamestation.  
Finally, in column (5), we present the results when we estimated our model using two 
samples that are as homogeneous as possible, i.e. they only include titles that belong to a 
series. The results still indicate a sharp reduction in the prices of the merging parties (shown 
by the interaction coefficient), but the average industry prices exhibit a very small decline and 
the coefficient is not significant.  This might be consistent with the view that buyers of games 
belonging to a series are more captive and less price-sensitive and, therefore, the prices of 
these games are reduced by less after the merger. 
Table 6 shows the results of the same robustness checks on pre-owned games.  The 
five different sub-samples are built accordingly to the logic discussed above. All results are in 
line with those obtained for mint games: both the post-merger coefficient and the interaction 
term, which captures the effect for the merging parties, are still negative and significant. 
[Table 6 about here] 
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Although the results obtained using these alternative samples give us confidence in the 
robustness of the main results, we performed a further check to verify whether the titles 
included in the sample have a role in driving the results. We ran 1000 regressions on 1000 
different samples, constructed by randomly excluding 20 pre-merger and 20 post-merger titles 
from the two original samples each time. For both mint (Figure 1) and pre-owned games 
(Figure 2), the results of these regressions show that the estimated coefficients for the post-
merger and interaction effects are always negative and all the estimated coefficients are 
significantly different from zero. These findings confirm that the decline in the merging 
parties’ prices for both types of games is not driven by the way in which the titles in the 
sample were selected. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
6. Conclusions 
We study the effect of a merger in a dynamic high-tech industry with rapidly changing 
technology –the videogame market– which is characterized by frequent introduction of new 
products. Moreover, because of its two-sided nature, this industry displays strong network 
effects linking the hardware market (i.e. the console platforms) and the software market (i.e. 
the videogames). It is therefore crucial to use a methodology that takes into account the 
specific features of this market to correctly assess the impact of the merger. Besides the 
peculiarities of the industry under consideration, the interest of our case study from a 
competition policy viewpoint lies on the fact that the decision on this merger was a tight one.  
Overall, the results of our econometric analyses suggest that, since the merger took 
place, there has been a reduction in the general level of prices of both mint and pre-owned 
games. This decline has been more marked for the merging parties, which suggests that the 
merger between Game and Gamestation did not lead to a substantial lessening of competition, 
neither in the mint nor in the pre-owned segment of the market.  
The result that the merging parties’ prices decreased more than the competitors’ prices 
is consistent with the merger creating efficiencies. In a market where prices are the firms’ 
main strategic variable, it is indeed plausible that average prices would decline if synergies 
are realized, and that the merging parties would reduce their prices more than their rivals. 
Given the lack of data, it was not possible to confirm whether merger-specific efficiency 
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gains could explain the observed trend in the prices. However, anecdotal evidence that we 
have obtained from market participants suggests that the merger has increased the parties’ 
efficiency and, in particular, their ability to obtain better terms from publishers and 
manufacturers. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Estimated Coefficients and t-values for the Post-merger (a) and for the 
Interaction (b) Effects: Mint Products  
  
(a)                                                          (b) 
 
Figure 2: Estimated Coefficients and t-values for the Post-merger (a) and for the 
Interaction (b) Effects: Pre-owned Products 
  
(a)                                                         (b) 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Pre-Merger  Post-Merger 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max  Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
price mint* 1254 26.80 10.62 0.99 69.99  1141 23.30 13.53 3.71 129.91 
price pre-owned* 657 23.39 9.20 3.99 64.99  388 17.31 11.06 2.98 110 
days release 1254 285.38 240.63 1 1955  1141 326.83 342.43 13 1648 
IntPubDev  1254 0.42 0.49 0 1  1141 0.38 0.49 0 1 
IntPubDevMan  1254 0.08 0.27 0 1  1141 0.10 0.30 0 1 
online  1254 0.22 0.41 0 1  1141 0.24 0.43 0 1 
bundle  1254 0.02 0.13 0 1  1141 0.06 0.25 0 1 
part of series  1254 0.78 0.42 0 1  1141 0.71 0.46 0 1 
press  1254 6.90 1.48 1.5 9.5  1141 7.47 1.33 2.5 9.6 
* Nominal prices are transformed into 2005 prices using the general Consumer Price Index (Source: UK 
Office for National Statistics). 
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Table 2: Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
  
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the console level. We include 10 publishers and 11 
developers’ fixed-effects. The symbols ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
  
Dependent Variable: Price 
(1) 
Mint 
games 
(2) 
Pre-owned 
games 
post -3.583*** -4.664*** 
 (0.832) (0.916) 
mergedｘpost -5.053** -4.519** 
(1.414) (1.223) 
part of series 4.640*** 3.773*** 
 (0.927) (0.882) 
press 0.592** 0.665** 
 (0.165) (0.253) 
bundle 25.30** 19.74*** 
 (7.167) (4.775) 
online 3.678** 1.863** 
 (0.980) (0.663) 
days release -0.0121** -0.0118** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
IntPubDev -1.244 -1.837 
 (1.282) (1.589) 
IntPubDevMan 0.778 2.249 
 (5.295) (5.937) 
constant 15.64*** 15.69*** 
 (2.755) (1.997) 
Observations 2395 1402 
R-squared 0.567 0.598 
Cluster Console  Console 
FE Retailer, 
console 
Retailer, 
console 
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Console 
Dependent Variable: 
Price 
Mint 
(1) 
Pre-owned 
(2) 
Mint 
(3) 
Pre-owned 
(4) 
post_NDS -1.223 -2.477* -0.0440 -1.913 
 (1.066) (1.154) (1.326) (1.155) 
post_PS2 -2.405*** -2.660*** -0.566 -1.590*** 
 (0.382) (0.363) (0.424) (0.332) 
post_PS3 -8.814*** -10.14*** -6.624*** -8.813*** 
 (0.588) (0.582) (0.842) (0.742) 
post_PSP -3.728*** -5.299*** -2.925** -4.637*** 
 (0.730) (0.836) (0.952) (0.945) 
post_Wii -7.502*** -8.183*** -6.457** -6.696*** 
 (1.828) (1.508) (1.874) (1.292) 
post_XBOX -7.187*** -6.772*** -5.728*** -4.345*** 
 (0.408) (0.595) (0.537) (0.483) 
mergedｘpost_NDS 
  -3.951** -2.000** 
   (1.025) (0.641) 
mergedｘpost_PS2 
  -5.825*** -3.088*** 
   (0.873) (0.652) 
mergedｘpost_PS3 
  -7.113*** -4.484*** 
   (1.055) (0.985) 
mergedｘpost_PSP 
  -2.461** -1.681** 
   (0.931) (0.456) 
mergedｘpost_Wii 
  -3.244** -8.002*** 
   (0.919) (1.141) 
mergedｘpost_XBOX 
  -4.741*** -9.486*** 
   (1.044) (0.824) 
Observations 2395 1402 2395 1402 
R-squared 0.569 0.615 0.578 0.615 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the console level. We 
include 10 publishers and 11 developers’ fixed-effects. The symbols ***, **, and 
* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 4: Analysis by Retailer 
 
 Mint  Pre-Owned  
Dependent Variable: 
Price 
Estimate 
 
(1) 
DiD 
Game 
(2) 
DiD 
Gamestat 
(3) 
 Estimate 
 
(4) 
DiD  
Game 
(5) 
DiD 
Gamestat 
(6) 
post_AMAZON -5.702** 2.326 3.564     -5.036*** 4.202** 4.100**    
 
(1.491) (1.518) (2.124)  (0.806) (1.503) (1.643) 
post_ASDA -3.449** 4.579**   5.817***    - - - 
 
(1.061) (1.208) (1.307)     
post_CeX - - -  -4.031** 5.206***   5.104**    
 
   
 (1.420) (1.035) (1.356) 
post_EBAY -1.751 6.277*    7.515*     - - - 
 
(1.598) (3.020) 3.487     
post_GAME -8.028*** - 1.238     -9.238*** - 0.102    
 
(1.633)  (0.978)  (1.561)  (1.114) 
post_GAMESTAT -9.266*** -1.238    -  -9.136*** 0.102    - 
 
(2.198) (0.978)   (1.859) (1.114)  
post_HMV -6.862*** 1.166 2.404   - - - 
 
(1.351) (0.735) (1.567)     
post_PLAY -1.236 6.792** 8.030**     -5.063*** 4.174**   4.073    
 
(1.281) (2.022) (2.612)  (0.714) (1.404) (1.836) 
post_TESCO -1.494 6.534***   7.772***    - - - 
 
(1.323) (1.217) (1.437)     
Observations 2395    1402   
R-squared 0.572    0.599   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the console level. We include 10 publishers and 
11 developers’ fixed-effects. The coefficients' estimates for all other control variables are not reported 
but they are almost identical with those reported in table 2. In columns (2) and (5) we report the 
difference between each of the post-merger retailer-specific estimated coefficients from columns (1) and 
(4) respectively and the coefficient estimate for Games (e.g,  βj – βGames). Similarly in columns (3) and 
(6), we report the difference between each of the retailer-specific estimated coefficients from columns 
(1) and (4) respectively and the coefficient estimate for Gamestation (e.g,  βj – βGamestation). The symbols 
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks: Mint games 
Dependent Variable 
Price Mint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
post  -2.703* -2.436* -4.619** -4.068** -0.549 
  (1.059) (0.978) (1.577) (1.126) (2.129) 
mergedｘpost 
-4.725*** -4.774*** -4.291** -4.114*** -5.046** 
 (0.868) (0.833) (1.183) (1.000) (1.258) 
part of series 3.667*** 5.478*** 3.552*** 3.628*** - 
 (0.823) (1.205) (0.690) (0.820)  
press 0.568** 0.611** 0.757** 0.465** 0.180 
 (0.175) (0.210) (0.232) (0.156) (0.988) 
bundle  16.29*** 21.98*** 24.10*** - 34.95*** 
 (1.348) (3.498) (3.772)  (4.427) 
online  3.930** 3.472* 2.501** 2.721** 7.040** 
 (1.196) (1.463) (0.876) (0.990) (2.283) 
days release  -0.012** -0.011* -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
IntPubDev -0.764 0.529 -0.625 -0.364 5.005 
 (1.323) (2.556) (1.753) (1.255) (2.569) 
IntPubDevMan 2.869 6.591 8.397*** 0.256 7.597 
 (5.515) (5.088) (1.621) (4.014) (5.775) 
constant 23.22*** 21.72*** 16.51*** 19.29*** 16.59 
 (3.356) (2.934) (4.035) (3.108) (11.49) 
Observations 1212 1298 1842 2296 442 
R-squared 0.539 0.552 0.600 0.554 0.751 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the console level. We include 10 
publishers and 11 developers’ fixed-effects. The symbols ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6: Robustness checks: Pre-owned games 
Dependent Variable: 
Price Pre-owned (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
post  -4.092*** -3.796** -4.853** -4.820*** -3.343 
 (0.894) (0.975) (1.353) (1.171) (2.055) 
mergedｘpost  
-5.060** -4.829** -4.993*** -4.460** -3.637** 
 (1.352) (1.239) (1.237) (1.321) (1.222) 
part of series  3.050** 4.353** 2.824** 2.748** - 
 (1.184) (1.252) (0.872) (0.774)  
press  0.330 0.279 0.793** 0.478 -0.542 
 (0.299) (0.363) (0.296) (0.290) (1.094) 
bundle  13.27*** 17.12*** 21.51*** - 29.50*** 
 (1.375) (2.252) (3.833)  (5.383) 
online  3.125* 2.994 1.703* 1.599* 6.603 
 (1.227) (1.654) (0.813) (0.782) (3.888) 
days release  -0.012** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011*** -0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
IntPubDev -1.059 -1.579 -1.972 -1.090 1.164 
 (1.440) (2.442) (1.908) (1.479) (2.144) 
IntPubDevMan 7.855 10.56** 10.74*** 1.636 9.010 
 (4.251) (3.583) (2.656) (5.120) (8.999) 
constant 28.60*** 14.09*** 26.80*** 19.65*** 46.21** 
 (1.714) (2.050) (1.826) (1.942) (11.99) 
Observations 686 723 1121 1349 267 
R-squared 0.567 0.599 0.632 0.599 0.783 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the console level. We include 10 
publishers and 11 developers’ fixed-effects. The symbols ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix. List of games titles included in the dataset 
Table A.1 below lists the games included in the database on which we perform our 
econometric analysis. The first column lists the title, while the second the console that 
supports it and the third whether it belongs to pre-merger or to the post-merger sample. 
Table A.1: List of the games included in our dataset 
 Title Console Sample 
1 24 the game PS2 pre-merger 
2 300 march to glory PSP pre-merger 
3 Mortal Kombat: Armageddon Wii pre-merger 
4 Tom Clancy ghost recon advanced warfighter 2 Xbox360 pre-merger 
5 after burner black falcon PSP pre-merger 
6 animal crossing wild world NDS pre-merger 
7 babe PS2 pre-merger 
8 batman begins PS2 pre-merger 
9 beverly hills cop PS2 pre-merger 
10 blazing angels squadrons of ww2 PS3 pre-merger 
11 brain training NDS pre-merger 
12 bratz ponyz NDS pre-merger 
13 brian lara international cricket 2007 PS2 pre-merger 
14 brian lara international cricket 2007 Xbox360 pre-merger 
15 brothers in arms NDS pre-merger 
16 burnout dominator PS2 pre-merger 
17 buzz! junior jungle party PS2 pre-merger 
18 buzz! junior robo jam bundle PS2 pre-merger 
19 buzz! mega quiz PS2 pre-merger 
20 call of duty 3 PS2 pre-merger 
21 call of duty 3 PS3 pre-merger 
22 call of duty 3 Xbox360 pre-merger 
23 call of duty 3 roads to victory PSP pre-merger 
24 call of juarez Xbox360 pre-merger 
25 canis canem edit PS2 pre-merger 
26 captain scarlet PS2 pre-merger 
27 championship manager 2007 PSP pre-merger 
28 championship manager 2007 Xbox360 pre-merger 
29 charlie and the chocolate factory PS2 pre-merger 
30 charlottes web PS2 pre-merger 
31 chicken little PS2 pre-merger 
32 colin mcrae dirt Xbox360 pre-merger 
33 command and conquer 3 tiberium wars Xbox360 pre-merger 
34 cooking mama Wii pre-merger 
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 Title Console Sample 
35 crackdown Xbox360 pre-merger 
36 dead rising classic Xbox360 pre-merger 
37 def jam icon PS3 pre-merger 
38 diddy kong racing ds NDS pre-merger 
39 dragon ball z:shin budokai 2 PSP pre-merger 
40 driver 76 PSP pre-merger 
41 driver parallel lines PS2 pre-merger 
42 driver parallel lines Wii pre-merger 
43 elite beat agents NDS pre-merger 
44 eragon PS2 pre-merger 
45 eyetoy kinetic combat PS2 pre-merger 
46 fantastic four: rise of the silver surfer NDS pre-merger 
47 fantastic four: rise of the silver surfer PS2 pre-merger 
48 fantastic four: rise of the silver surfer PS3 pre-merger 
49 fantastic four: rise of the silver surfer Wii pre-merger 
50 fantastic four: rise of the silver surfer Xbox360 pre-merger 
51 far cry vengeance Wii pre-merger 
52 fifa 07 PS2 pre-merger 
53 fifa 07 Xbox360 pre-merger 
54 fight night round 3 PS3 pre-merger 
55 final fantasy 3 NDS pre-merger 
56 final fantasy X PS2 pre-merger 
57 final fantasy XII PS2 pre-merger 
58 final fantasy: fables chocobo tales NDS pre-merger 
59 flatout ultimate carnage Xbox360 pre-merger 
60 flushed away PS2 pre-merger 
61 football generation PS2 pre-merger 
62 football manager 07 PSP pre-merger 
63 formula one championship edition PS3 pre-merger 
64 forza motorsports 2 Xbox360 pre-merger 
65 free running PS2 pre-merger 
66 gears of war Xbox360 pre-merger 
67 ghost rider PS2 pre-merger 
68 god of war 2 PS2 pre-merger 
69 grand theft auto: liberty city stories PSP pre-merger 
70 grand theft auto: vice city stories PS2 pre-merger 
71 grand theft auto: vice city stories PSP pre-merger 
72 guitar hero 2 bundle Xbox360 pre-merger 
73 happy feet NDS pre-merger 
74 happy feet PS2 pre-merger 
75 harry potter order of the phoenix NDS pre-merger 
76 harry potter order of the phoenix PS2 pre-merger 
77 harry potter order of the phoenix PS3 pre-merger 
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 Title Console Sample 
78 harry potter order of the phoenix PSP pre-merger 
79 harry potter order of the phoenix Wii pre-merger 
80 harry potter order of the phoenix Xbox360 pre-merger 
81 harvest moon NDS pre-merger 
82 hot brains PSP pre-merger 
83 hour of victory Xbox360 pre-merger 
84 ice age 2 PS2 pre-merger 
85 just cause PS2 pre-merger 
86 lets make a soccer team PS2 pre-merger 
87 little britain PS2 pre-merger 
88 lost planet extreme condition Xbox360 pre-merger 
89 mario kart DS NDS pre-merger 
90 mario party 8 Wii pre-merger 
91 mario strikers charged football Wii pre-merger 
92 matrix path of neo PS2 pre-merger 
93 medal of honour heroes PSP pre-merger 
94 medal of honour vanguard PS2 pre-merger 
95 meet the robinsons NDS pre-merger 
96 meet the robinsons PS2 pre-merger 
97 mercury meltdown revolution Wii pre-merger 
98 metal gear solid: portable ops PSP pre-merger 
99 micro machines PS2 pre-merger 
100 mind quiz: your brain coach NDS pre-merger 
101 more brain training NDS pre-merger 
102 motorstorm PS3 pre-merger 
103 need for speed carbon PS2 pre-merger 
104 need for speed carbon PS3 pre-merger 
105 need for speed carbon PSP pre-merger 
106 need for speed carbon Xbox360 pre-merger 
107 new super mario bros NDS pre-merger 
108 ninja gaiden sigma PS3 pre-merger 
109 nintendogs labrador and friends NDS pre-merger 
110 oblivion PS3 pre-merger 
111 overlord Xbox360 pre-merger 
112 pirates of the caribbean 2: the legend of jack sparrow PS2 pre-merger 
113 pirates of the caribbean 3 at world's end NDS pre-merger 
114 pirates of the caribbean 3 at world's end PS2 pre-merger 
115 pirates of the caribbean 3 at world's end PS3 pre-merger 
116 pirates of the caribbean 3 at world's end PSP pre-merger 
117 pirates of the caribbean 3 at world's end Wii pre-merger 
118 pirates of the caribbean 3 at world's end Xbox360 pre-merger 
119 pokemon ranger NDS pre-merger 
120 pony friends NDS pre-merger 
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 Title Console Sample 
121 pro evolution soccer 5 PS2 pre-merger 
122 pro evolution soccer 6 PS2 pre-merger 
123 pro evolution soccer 6 Xbox360 pre-merger 
124 ratchet & clank: size matters PSP pre-merger 
125 resident evil 4 Wii pre-merger 
126 resistance fall of man PS3 pre-merger 
127 ridge racer 7 PS3 pre-merger 
128 rocky balboa PSP pre-merger 
129 rollercoaster world PS2 pre-merger 
130 saints row Xbox360 pre-merger 
131 sbk 07: superbike world championship PS2 pre-merger 
132 scarface the world is yours Wii pre-merger 
133 sega presents touch darts NDS pre-merger 
134 shadowrun Xbox360 pre-merger 
135 shrek the third NDS pre-merger 
136 shrek the third PS2 pre-merger 
137 shrek the third Wii pre-merger 
138 shrek the third Xbox360 pre-merger 
139 sim city NDS pre-merger 
140 sims 2 pets Wii pre-merger 
141 socom u.s. navy seals combined assault PS2 pre-merger 
142 socom u.s. navy seals fireteam bravo 2 PSP pre-merger 
143 sonic and the secret rings Wii pre-merger 
144 sonic riders PS2 pre-merger 
145 sonic rivals PSP pre-merger 
146 spectrobes NDS pre-merger 
147 spiderman 3 NDS pre-merger 
148 spiderman 3 PS2 pre-merger 
149 spiderman 3 PS3 pre-merger 
150 spiderman 3 Wii pre-merger 
151 spiderman 3 Xbox360 pre-merger 
152 spongebob battle for volcano island PS2 pre-merger 
153 spy hunter nowhere to run PS2 pre-merger 
154 super monkey ball: banana blitz Wii pre-merger 
155 table tennis Xbox360 pre-merger 
156 tamagotchi connection 2 NDS pre-merger 
157 teenage mutant ninja turtles NDS pre-merger 
158 teenage mutant ninja turtles PS2 pre-merger 
159 teenage mutant ninja turtles PSP pre-merger 
160 teenage mutant ninja turtles Wii pre-merger 
161 teenage mutant ninja turtles Xbox360 pre-merger 
162 test drive unlimited PS2 pre-merger 
163 the chronicles of narnia: the lion, the witch and the wardrobe PS2 pre-merger 
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 Title Console Sample 
164 the da vinci code PS2 pre-merger 
165 the darkness Xbox360 pre-merger 
166 the incredibles: rise of the underminer PS2 pre-merger 
167 the legend of Zelda: twilight princess Wii pre-merger 
168 the simpsons hit and run PS2 pre-merger 
169 the ultimate world cup quiz PS2 pre-merger 
170 tiger woods pga tour 2007 PS3 pre-merger 
171 tiger woods pga tour 2007 Wii pre-merger 
172 tom clancys rainbow 6 vegas PSP pre-merger 
173 tom clancys rainbow 6 vegas Xbox360 pre-merger 
174 tom clancys splinter cell double agent PS3 pre-merger 
175 tom clancys splinter cell double agent Xbox360 pre-merger 
176 tomb raider anniversary PS2 pre-merger 
177 tomb raider legend NDS pre-merger 
178 tomb raider legend PS2 pre-merger 
179 tony hawks project 8 PS3 pre-merger 
180 touchmaster NDS pre-merger 
181 uefa champions league 2006-2007 PS2 pre-merger 
182 uefa champions league 2006-2007 PSP pre-merger 
183 uefa champions league 2006-2007 Xbox360 pre-merger 
184 virtua fighter 5 PS3 pre-merger 
185 virtua tennis 3 PS3 pre-merger 
186 virtua tennis 3 PSP pre-merger 
187 virtua tennis 3 Wii pre-merger 
188 virtua tennis 3 Xbox360 pre-merger 
189 wario ware: smooth moves Wii pre-merger 
190 wario: master of disguise NDS pre-merger 
191 who wants to be a millionaire PS2 pre-merger 
192 wii play and wireless remote Wii pre-merger 
193 world snooker championship 2007 PS3 pre-merger 
194 wwe smackdown vs raw 2007 PS2 pre-merger 
195 wwi aces of the sky PS2 pre-merger 
196 yu-gi-oh!gx tag force PSP pre-merger 
197 2010 fifa world cup PS3 post-merger 
198 2010 fifa world cup PSP post-merger 
199 2010 fifa world cup Wii post-merger 
200 2010 fifa world cup Xbox360 post-merger 
201 Assassin's Creed: Bloodlines PSP post-merger 
202 Band Hero PS3 post-merger 
203 Band Hero PS3 post-merger 
204 Batman: Arkham Asylum Game of the Year Edition PS3 post-merger 
205 Battlefield Bad Company 2 PS3 post-merger 
206 Battlefield Bad Company 2 Xbox360 post-merger 
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 Title Console Sample 
207 Ben 10 Alien Force Vilgax Attacks PS2 post-merger 
208 Ben 10: Alien Force PS2 post-merger 
209 Brutal Legend PS3 post-merger 
210 Buzz The Pop Quiz Solus PS2 post-merger 
211 Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare PS3 post-merger 
212 Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare Xbox360 post-merger 
213 Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 Xbox360 post-merger 
214 Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (with Exclusive Gamerpics) Xbox360 post-merger 
215 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 Limited GAME Exclusive Veteran 
Package PS3 post-merger 
216 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 Limited GAME Exclusive Veteran 
Package Xbox360 post-merger 
217 Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 Limited Hardened Edition PS3 post-merger 
218 Call of Duty: World at War PS2 post-merger 
219 Call of Duty: World at War PS3 post-merger 
220 Cars Race-O-Rama PS2 post-merger 
221 Cars Race-O-Rama Wii post-merger 
222 Combat of Giants: Mutant Insect NDS post-merger 
223 Cooking Mama 3 NDS post-merger 
224 Crash Bandicoot: Mind Over Mutant PS2 post-merger 
225 DJ Hero PS3 post-merger 
226 Darksiders PS3 post-merger 
227 Darksiders Xbox360 post-merger 
228 Daxter - Platinum PSP post-merger 
229 Dead Space PS3 post-merger 
230 Dead to Rights: Retribution PS3 post-merger 
231 Diabolik PS2 post-merger 
232 Dissidia: Final Fantasy PSP post-merger 
233 Dr. Kawashima's Brain Training: How Old Is Your Brain? NDS post-merger 
234 Dragon Age: Origins PS3 post-merger 
235 Dragon Age: Origins Xbox360 post-merger 
236 Dragon Age: Origins GAME Exclusive Collector's Edition PS3 post-merger 
237 EA Sports Active (Wii Balance Board Compatible) Wii post-merger 
238 EA Sports Active: More Workouts Wii post-merger 
239 EyePet PS3 post-merger 
240 EyePet PS3 post-merger 
241 Fable 2 GOTY Classic Xbox360 post-merger 
242 Fallout 3 PS3 post-merger 
243 Family Trainer Wii post-merger 
244 Final Fantasy XIII PS3 post-merger 
245 Final Fantasy XIII Xbox360 post-merger 
246 Forza Motorsport 3 Xbox360 post-merger 
247 GI Joe: The Rise of Cobra PS2 post-merger 
248 GTA Chinatown Wars PSP post-merger 
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 Title Console Sample 
249 God Of War Platinum PSP post-merger 
250 God of War III PS3 post-merger 
251 Gran Turismo PSP post-merger 
252 Grand Theft Auto IV Platinum PS3 post-merger 
253 Grand Theft Auto: Episodes from Liberty City PS3 post-merger 
254 Grid: Reloaded Platinum PS3 post-merger 
255 Guitar Hero 5 (Software Only) PS3 post-merger 
256 Guitar Hero: Greatest Hits Xbox360 post-merger 
257 Halo 3 Classic Xbox360 post-merger 
258 Halo 3: ODST including Halo Reach BETA Access Xbox360 post-merger 
259 Halo Wars Classic Xbox360 post-merger 
260 Harry Potter and the Half Blood Prince PS2 post-merger 
261 Heavy Rain PS3 post-merger 
262 IL2 Sturmovik: Birds of Prey PSP post-merger 
263 Ice Age 3: Dawn of the Dinosaurs PS2 post-merger 
264 Invizimals PSP post-merger 
265 Invizimals PSP post-merger 
266 Iron Man 2 PS3 post-merger 
267 Iron Man 2 PSP post-merger 
268 James Cameron's Avatar: The Game PS3 post-merger 
269 James Cameron's Avatar: The Game PSP post-merger 
270 James Cameron's Avatar: The Game Xbox360 post-merger 
271 James Cameron's Avatar: The Game Limited Collector's Edition Wii post-merger 
272 Jelly Belly: Ballistic Beans PS2 post-merger 
273 Jewel Quest Mysteries : Curse Of The Emerald Tear NDS post-merger 
274 Just Cause 2 PS3 post-merger 
275 Just Cause 2 Xbox360 post-merger 
276 Just Cause 2 Limited Edition PS3 post-merger 
277 Just Cause 2 Limited Edition Xbox360 post-merger 
278 Just Dance Wii post-merger 
279 Killzone 2 PS3 post-merger 
280 King of Fighters XII PS3 post-merger 
281 Kingdom Hearts 358/2 Days NDS post-merger 
282 LEGO Batman: The Video Game NDS post-merger 
283 LEGO Batman: The Video Game PS2 post-merger 
284 LEGO Batman: The Video Game PSP post-merger 
285 LEGO Batman: The Video Game Wii post-merger 
286 LEGO Battles NDS post-merger 
287 LEGO Indiana Jones 2: The Adventure Continues PSP post-merger 
288 Lips: Party Classics Xbox360 post-merger 
289 LittleBigPlanet PSP post-merger 
290 LittleBigPlanet Game of the Year Edition PS3 post-merger 
291 Mah Jong Quest Expeditions NDS post-merger 
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 Title Console Sample 
292 Mario Kart DS NDS post-merger 
293 Mario Kart Wii with Official Wii Wheel Wii post-merger 
294 Mario and Luigi: Bowser's Inside Story NDS post-merger 
295 Mario and Sonic at the Olympic Games Wii post-merger 
296 Marvel Ultimate Alliance 2 PS2 post-merger 
297 Marvel Ultimate Alliance 2: Jean Grey Edition PS3 post-merger 
298 Mass Effect - Classic Xbox360 post-merger 
299 Medal of Honor Heroes 2 Wii post-merger 
300 Metro 2033 GAME Exclusive Limited Edition Xbox360 post-merger 
301 Minority Report PS2 post-merger 
302 Mirror's Edge PS3 post-merger 
303 Mirror's Edge Xbox360 post-merger 
304 Monster Hunter Tri Wii post-merger 
305 Monster Hunter Tri Wii post-merger 
306 Monster Hunter Tri Limited Edition Ultimate Hunter Pack Wii post-merger 
307 Mx vs ATV Reflex PS3 post-merger 
308 Mystery Tales: Time Travel NDS post-merger 
309 Need for Speed: Shift PS3 post-merger 
310 Need for Speed: Shift Special Edition PS3 post-merger 
311 Need for Speed: Undercover PS3 post-merger 
312 New Super Mario Bros Wii post-merger 
313 New Super Mario Bros. NDS post-merger 
314 Nier PS3 post-merger 
315 Nier Xbox360 post-merger 
316 Oblivion: Game of the Year Edition - Platinum PS3 post-merger 
317 Peppa Pig NDS post-merger 
318 Peppa Pig 2: Fun and Games NDS post-merger 
319 Planet 51 PS3 post-merger 
320 Pokemon Heart Gold (Includes Pokewalker) NDS post-merger 
321 Pokemon Soul Silver (Includes Pokewalker) NDS post-merger 
322 Princess Melody NDS post-merger 
323 Pro Evolution Soccer 2009 PS2 post-merger 
324 Pro Evolution Soccer 2010 PS2 post-merger 
325 Professor Layton and Pandora's Box NDS post-merger 
326 Ratchet & Clank: Quest For Booty PS3 post-merger 
327 Ratchet & Clank: Size Matters - Platinum PSP post-merger 
328 Resident Evil 5: Gold Edition PS3 post-merger 
329 Resident Evil 5: Gold Edition Xbox360 post-merger 
330 Rhythm Paradise NDS post-merger 
331 Rock Band Song Pack 2 PS3 post-merger 
332 Rock Band Unplugged PSP post-merger 
333 Rugby League 3 Wii post-merger 
334 Rugby League Challenge PSP post-merger 
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335 Safari Adventures Africa PS2 post-merger 
336 Scrabble 2009 NDS post-merger 
337 Secret Service PS2 post-merger 
338 Sega Mega Drive Ultimate Collection PS3 post-merger 
339 Sega Mega Drive Ultimate Collection Xbox360 post-merger 
340 Silent Hill: Homecoming PS3 post-merger 
341 Sin and Punishment 2: Successor of the Skies Wii post-merger 
342 Sonic & SEGA All-Stars Racing NDS post-merger 
343 Sonic & SEGA All-Stars Racing PS3 post-merger 
344 Sonic & SEGA All-Stars Racing Xbox360 post-merger 
345 Sonic Classic Collection NDS post-merger 
346 Star Ocean: The Last Hope International PS3 post-merger 
347 Star Wars: Battlefront Elite Squadron PSP post-merger 
348 Super Street Fighter IV PS3 post-merger 
349 Super Street Fighter IV Xbox360 post-merger 
350 Tales of Symphonia: Dawn of The New World Wii post-merger 
351 The God of War Collection PS3 post-merger 
352 The Legend of Spyro: Dawn of the Dragon PS2 post-merger 
353 The Legend of Zelda: Spirit Tracks NDS post-merger 
354 The Princess and the Frog NDS post-merger 
355 The Saboteur PS3 post-merger 
356 Tiger Woods PGA Tour 09 PSP post-merger 
357 Tiger Woods PGA Tour 2010 PS3 post-merger 
358 Tom Clancy's H.A.W.X Xbox360 post-merger 
359 Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell: Conviction Xbox360 post-merger 
360 
Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell: Conviction GAME Exclusive Collector's 
Edition Xbox360 post-merger 
361 Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell: Conviction Shadow Edition Xbox360 post-merger 
362 
Tony Hawk: Ride (with GAME Exclusive Wireless Skateboard 
Controller) PS3 post-merger 
363 Top Gun PS2 post-merger 
364 Toy Story Mania Wii post-merger 
365 Transformers: Revenge of The Fallen PS2 post-merger 
366 Travel Games for Dummies NDS post-merger 
367 Uncharted 2: Among Thieves PS3 post-merger 
368 Uncharted 2: Among Thieves Special Edition PS3 post-merger 
369 Up PSP post-merger 
370 WWE SmackDown vs Raw 2010 PS3 post-merger 
371 WWE Smackdown vs Raw 2009 Collector's Edition PS3 post-merger 
372 WarioWare DIY NDS post-merger 
373 We Sing Wii post-merger 
374 We Sing Wii post-merger 
375 Where the Wild Things Are PS3 post-merger 
376 White Knight Chronicles PS3 post-merger 
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377 Wii Fit Plus Wii post-merger 
378 Wii Fit Plus Wii post-merger 
379 Wii Play with Wii Remote Wii post-merger 
380 Wii Watersports Wii post-merger 
381 Wipeout HD PS3 post-merger 
382 Wizards Of Waverly Place NDS post-merger 
383 Wolfenstein Xbox360 post-merger 
384 Your Shape (includes Motion-Tracking Camera) Wii post-merger 
385 Yu-Gi-Oh! Tag Force 4 PSP post-merger 
386 Yu-Gi-Oh! World Championship 2010 NDS post-merger 
387 advance wars dark conflict NDS post-merger 
388 aliens vs predator PS3 post-merger 
389 army of two: the 40th day PS3 post-merger 
390 assassin's creed 2 Xbox360 post-merger 
391 assassins creed 2 PS3 post-merger 
392 assassins creed 2 game exclusive white edition PS3 post-merger 
393 cooking mama NDS post-merger 
394 fifa 10 NDS post-merger 
395 fifa 10 PS3 post-merger 
396 fifa 10 PSP post-merger 
397 grand theft auto: liberty city stories PSP post-merger 
398 grand theft auto: vice city stories PSP post-merger 
 
 
 
